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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
PREDATORY PRICING IN COMPETITION LAW 
 
 
BY SIMGE ŞAŞMAZ 
 
 
Keywords:  Predatory pricing, Turkish predatory pricing  cases 
 
 
Predatory pricing can be described as an anticompetitive strategy, with which the 
predator aims to deter entry to the market or to expel other players from it, in order to gain 
market share and extra profits, related to the dominant position it will have. The feasibility of 
this strategy has been questioned by the economists and several theories about the reasons and 
feasibility of predation have emerged in time. In addition to that, different criteria and tests, 
related to these theories, have been introduced to the economics literature, to serve for 
predation analysis. 
From the beginning of 1900s on, several firms have been accused with predatory 
pricing charges. Competition authorities in different countries have dealt with these 
accusations and analyzed cases in light of the proposed criteria and tests. Most important 
examples came from United States and European Union exercises. It can be argued that 
United States competition authority followed classical economic theory arguments in their 
decisions, whereas European Union Commission followed modern theory arguments.  
This thesis examines predatory pricing in detail with its theory and real life examples 
from United States, European Union and Turkey. It aims to compare the approach of the 
competition authorities in these countries to predatory pricing, by analyzing different cases.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
REKABET HUKUKUNDA  YIKICI FİYATLANDIRMA 
 
 
BY SIMGE ŞAŞMAZ 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Yıkıcı fiyatlandırma, Türkiye’deki yıkıcı fiyatlandırma davaları 
 
 
Yıkıcı fiyatlandırma, yıkıcının pazar payı ve bununla bağlantılı olarak olağandışı kar 
kazanmak amacıyla, pazara girişi engellemek veya pazardaki diğer oyuncuları pazardan 
çıkarmak için uyguladığı rekabete aykırı bir strateji olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu stratejinin 
uygulanabilirliği ekonomistler tarafından sorgulanmış ve zaman içinde bu stratejinin 
uygulanabilirliği ve sebepleri üzerine çeşitli teoriler ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak, yıkıcı 
fiyatlandırma analizi için bu teorilerle alakalı çeşitli kriterler ve testler ekonomi literatürüne 
girmiştir. 
1900’lerin başından itibaren, çeşitli firmalar yıkıcı fiyatlandırma ithamlarıyla 
suçlanmıştır. Ülkelerin rekabet kurumları, bu suçlamaları öne sürülen testlerin ve kriterlerin 
ışığında değerlendirmiştir. Bu konudaki en önemli örnekler, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve 
Avrupa Birliği’ndeki tecrübelerden gelir. Rekabet kurumunun kararlarını alırken, Amerika 
Birleşik Devletleri’nde klasik teorinin, Avrupa Birliği’nde ise modern teorinin argumanlarını 
takip ettiği söylenebilir. 
Bu tez, yıkıcı fiyatlandırmayı teori kapsamında ve Amerika Birleşik Devleri, Avrupa 
Birliği ve Türkiye’de yaşanmış örnekleriyle detaylı olarak ele almaktadır. Ayrıca, farklı 
rekabet kurumlarının yıkıcı fiyatlandırma davalarına yaklaşımlarını, ayrı davaları inceleyerek 
karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Pricing is an important tool that can be used for or against competition. It is assumed 
that under perfect competition all prices will be equal to the marginal cost levels, as firms 
operate efficiently. According to this assumption, lower prices will be perceived positive for 
competition. But this inference will not be true for all cases, because of the “predatory 
pricing” phenomenon. Sometimes competition itself can be hurt because of very low prices. 
The most general definition of predatory pricing has been done by Bolton and Riordian as the 
price decrease to gain additional market power by eliminating competitors. 
In former times predatory pricing have been thought as a reasonable strategy, but 
especially after McGee it has been stated that predatory pricing is irrational and rarely 
practiced in real life, whereas more recent arguments are in favor of predatory pricing again. 
It is claimed that predatory pricing can be a rational strategy in special circumstances. 
According to this argument underlying causes of low prices have to be questioned very well. 
Higher prices will end up in extraordinary profit gains for the dominant firms, whereas lower 
prices will deter entry into the market and hurt competition in long run, thus it will again lead 
to higher prices with extraordinary profits. Also there is another issue named as non-price 
predation, in which predator firm try to increase the costs and create barriers for its 
competitors with abuse of its dominance position. In non-price and price predation, the 
predator mainly shares similar characteristics. Thus, it becomes very important to create a 
control mechanism with application of certain, special tests, for hindering predation. Applied 
tests should be not over inclusive, leading to the error of stating nonpredatory prices as 
predatory, nor under inclusive, missing predatory prices and hurting competition in the long 
run.  
Predatory pricing analysis has a long history. In US, first important case about predatory 
pricing was Standard Oil Company suit, which can be considered as the reason for publication 
of Clayton Act in 1914. Until McGee, cases were analyzed mostly out of scope of economics, 
but after his contributions to this area, suits were investigated in light of a new point of view. 
Until late 1980s, there were not any significant predatory pricing cases in European Union. 
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Thus, AKZO case can be considered as the first important suit in predatory pricing area in 
European Union history. Because of this time lag, it can be said that European Union’s 
decision process used the advantage of being a late comer, and have been cherished by US 
experience.  As Turkish competition law has been prepared according to the European Treaty, 
it can be stated that at the beginning it has been more affected by European experience, 
although there are differences between them.  
This thesis aims to give some examples of predatory pricing cases in these three 
different parts of the world and try to analyze and compare different approaches used by the 
competition authorities for the analysis of these cases. In the next section, different theories 
and concept of predatory pricing will be explained with referring to its historical background. 
Then criteria and tests for predatory pricing will be explained in detail. Afterwards United 
States, European Union and Turkey practices and examples will take place in consecutive 
sections. Sixth chapter will be about different key indicators, which is been used in decisions 
of predatory pricing cases. The seventh chapter will conclude the discussion. 
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2. PREDATORY PRICING 
 
2.1 The Concept, Definition and the Theory 
 
2.1.1 The Concept and Definition 
 
Competition can be considered as one of the most important points, that helps to ensure 
efficient use of scarce resources. Competition laws and authorities try to protect  this 
mechanism against abusive practices like predation. Even though, at fist sight, low prices can 
be seen in favor of consumers and competition, in real life they can be harmful. Thus there 
must be some criteria, set for control mechanism. 
The competitive implication of price reductions is an important issue in competition 
regulations. On one hand low prices can be interpreted as a consumer friendly exercise, 
pointing out the efficiency of the firm. On the other hand it can arise as a result of abuse of 
the firm’s dominant position. So in the analysis of predatory pricing cases, different aspects 
have to be taken into consideration. 
In order to analyze this concept, first it has to be defined. There exist different 
definitions about it. According to  Bolton and Riordian, predatory pricing in economic terms 
can be defined as “a price reduction that is profitable only because of the added market power 
the predator gains from eliminating, disciplining or otherwise inhibiting the competitive 
conduct of a rival or potential rival.” (Bolton and Riordian, 2000, 2242) In other words a price 
cutting exercise can be defined as predatory pricing, when the predator only benefits from it 
in the long run, by gaining market power and ability to raise prices again, thus driving its 
rivals out the market. Thus, the prices charged by firms are not profit maximizing in the short 
run, but will be profit maximizing in the long run. Predatory pricing can be used as a tool 
either against existing rivals, in order to exclude them from the market or against potential 
rivals in order to prevent them from entering to the defined market.  When competition in the 
market is assured, it is assumed that firms will be obliged to operate more effectively, and will 
thrive to reduce their costs and prices, and, in parallel to that, consumers will be able to enjoy 
the better quality goods and services at a lower cost and higher availability. But in predatory 
pricing cases, as rivals (potential or existing) will be excluded, in the long run the result will 
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be reduced innovation, leading reduced efficiency, less output and higher prices. In order to 
inspect these exercises, basic rules depending on cost, market structure, recoupment and 
intention have to be defined. (Bolton and Riordian,2000 ,2242) 
 
2.1.2 The Theory 
 
2.1.2.1  Historical Background 
 
Although from the Sherman Act on predatory pricing was prohibited in legal terms, 
until recently a solid theory was not developed. One of the early papers analyzing predatory 
pricing is written by John S. McGee in 1958. He analyzed the “Standard Oil” case and tried to 
come out with some explanations about this phenomenon. Through a long time, “Standard 
Oil” case has been considered as the most classic example of predation.  It is believed that 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey charged predatory prices and gained its monopoly power with 
this strategy. It has eliminated all competitors in different markets one by one. Also the 
entrants faced predatory prices, such that they have been discouraged to enter. McGee (1958) 
analyzed this case and argued that Standard Oil has not gained its monopoly power through 
predatory pricing. Also in his article, he has pointed out four reasons as to why predatory 
pricing is not a reasonable hypothesis.  
First he stated that a firm with greater market share will incur greater losses from a 
reduction in prices, as it sells more units. Critics put forward against this argument stress that 
it underestimates the possibility that the predator can charge different prices in different 
markets. When the firm discriminates prices, its losses will be not such crucial as McGee 
assumed to be.  
Secondly, he explained that predatory pricing will be only profitable when small firms 
leave the market and the predator can recoup its losses. He stated, even if smaller firms get 
out of the market, their facilities will not disappear. As a result of this situation, new firms can 
use these facilities and enter the market, whenever they see the possibility of profitability. 
Thus the predator can not recoup its losses as it has expected. But we must take into account 
that this argument does not take sunk costs into account. By entering a market, generally 
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firms may incur sunk costs not depending on production. If these are considered, it can be 
easily concluded that entry decisions will not be as easy as McGee assumes.  
The third argument made by McGee is the “deep pocket” theory. Shortly the deep 
pocket theory can be explained as follows. Firms with higher market share can access greater 
financial resources, thus can engage in a price war, whereas smaller firms with limited access 
to financial funds, can not survive prices below cost. Sooner or later these small firms will be 
out of the industry and leave the market to the predator, as they can not get enough financial 
resources. In this period, the predator can recoup its losses by setting prices above the 
competitive level. Although it has some point, in real world theoretically small firms get 
financial resources from banks and other financial institutions, when they can prove that this 
funding enables them to stay at the market and as a result the predator will end its strategy.  
Finally McGee argues that in order to be considered as an economically rational 
strategy, predatory pricing must be not only feasible but also more profitable than other 
possible strategies. It is stated that in most cases a merger strategy will be more profitable. As 
in predation period, prices are below cost level, the predator will gain less than the merger 
case, so it will not be rational. This argument can also be criticized from different point of 
views. To begin with, when new firms see the possibility to be sold out to the incumbent firm 
with higher profit, they will enter the market. Secondly, there could be different strategies, 
other than predation and merger, such as aggressive price behavior. Using these strategies can 
be more beneficial for the incumbent firm. The last criticism to this argument depends on 
legal framework. In some countries, it is not allowed for dominant firms to buy rivals, in 
order to protect the competitive environment.  
Recently with developments in economic theory new explanations for predatory pricing, 
challenging McGee’s economic analysis, have emerged. The increasing number of 
observations related to predatory pricing practices has helped the development of these new 
theories. But the main reason of this new point of view is the developments in the field of 
game theory. Modern game theory approach enables more complex analyses of different 
situations that can arise. These new theories explain predatory pricing in a dynamic 
framework and under asymmetric information, whereas McGee’s arguments relied on static 
analysis under symmetric information. In this new formulation, it has been shown that when 
firms act strategically they can gain profit. Basically it depends on influencing the rival’s 
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expectations about the competition and profitability in the market. According to Paul 
Milgrom (1987, 937-938), any price decrease can discourage rivals in the market, and it can 
lead to decreased investment levels and deterrence of entry to the market due to decreased 
profitability. The predator will benefit from the new market conditions, as it will operate as 
monopoly.  
Especially in industries where continuous innovation and intellectual property rights 
play an important role, predatory pricing exercises can be more influential. As the industry 
involves in more complex processes, asymmetric information will affect the analysis more, so 
the possibility of predatory pricing resulting in higher profits will increase.  
To sum up, predatory pricing can be considered as a rational and profit maximizing 
strategy under asymmetric information.  McGee’s assumptions were challenged by different 
theories, like reputation, signaling and financial market predation models. These recently 
developed models have one important feature in common; they provide solutions to markets 
under asymmetric information. In other words, predation can be a profitable strategy only in a 
world with uncertainty and imperfect information. If all the firms and investors –players in 
the market- have perfect information (on preferences, technology level, available financial 
resources for each firm, etc...), predation would never occur, as it would not be profitable for 
the incumbent. But in real life competition occurs under asymmetric information, thus 
predatory pricing exercises can exist. In the next sections, reputation, signalling, financial 
market predation and other models will be explained in detail.  
2.1.2.2  Reputation Models 
 
In reputation models, it is assumed that the incumbents’ behavior against a potential 
entrant will affect future potential competitors as well. Under asymmetric information the 
incumbent can create a reputation of being cost effective and strong, such that new entrants 
would not choose to operate in these markets. This effect will exist when the incumbent firm 
operates in a number of “identical” markets or in the same market in successive time periods. 
When predator operates in two or more markets, engaging in predatory pricing exercises in 
one market will create a reputation of being strong, such that potential competitors in other 
markets will not enter. The market or time period, in which the incumbent sets predatory price 
7 
 
can be seen as the demonstration market. Firms’ actions in this market (or time period) will 
alienate potential entrants in other markets and the firm will recoup its losses. Potential 
competitors will not choose to enter, as they see that the incumbent will set aggressively low 
prices, such that they could not fight and make profit. Thus, predatory prices allow the 
incumbent to increase its prices in other markets and make extra profits. (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982, 280-281)  
The main point to consider in reputation models is that they give rational solutions only 
under asymmetric information. Selten (1975) has shown in his paper that a weak incumbent 
with a cost structure similar to the entrants’ will always accommodate under symmetric 
information, so predatory pricing will never occur. But under asymmetric information, 
reputation effect can be seen as a mechanism to prevent entry into markets and thereby 
protecting monopoly profits of the incumbent. The predator -even a weak one- can guarantee 
its position, if it can represent itself as a tough player, having lower costs than its competitors. 
Existing rivals can exit the market, when they can not compete with the prices, and potential 
competitors or entrants will be discouraged to enter the market, when they believe that this 
exercise can be repeated in the future. 
For the reputation strategy to take place, some conditions have to be fulfilled first. 
According to Bolton and Riordian (2000, 2303-2304) four preconditions must be present for 
the existence and success of predatory pricing. These preconditions are:  
“1. The predator; a dominant multi-market firm, faces localized or product limited  
competition or potential competition sour alternatively, operating within a single market, 
the predator faces probable successive entry over time. 
 2. The alleged reputation effect either reinforces another identified predatory 
strategy pursued by the predator; such as financial market predation, or is 
based on the perceived probability that a predator who has once cut price in 
response to new entry is likely to repeat that conduct in the future. 
 3. The predator deliberately pursues a reputation effect strategy. 
To prevent over inclusiveness, the proposed rule requires proof that the 
predator deliberately sought to acquire an entry-deterring reputation as a profit-seeking 
strategy. 
 4. The potential entrant observes the exit or other adverse effect experienced 
by the predator's existing rival in the demonstration market, such knowledge 
is to be presumed if it is commonly known in the industry.” 
 
The first condition enables the predator to create its reputation as a strong incumbent, 
which can cut prices, whereas it can recoup its losses in other markets or time periods. In 
other words, the game has to be played in several different periods or markets, in order to 
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benefit from reputation and get monopoly profits at a different market or later time period by 
hurting actual or potential competition. 
By the second condition the credibility of the reputation policy plays an important role. 
If the predators’ credibility pursuing this strategy is credible, then potential or existing 
competitors will be aware of the fact that they will face lower prices and they will exit the 
market. But although it is weakly plausible, even an incumbent can pursue this strategy and 
be successful, when asymmetric information is available. The entrant or potential competitor 
will believe that the predator has some advantage and can set lower prices, when they get into 
the same market. So they can choose not to fight. 
To increase the effect of reputation strategy there must be also some viable evidence for 
the competitors. The evidences can be in different forms, like proof of cooperate plans to 
engage in reputation predation, publicizing failure examples of entry into the market, keeping 
information about the firms’ financial and investment situation secret and persistence in 
application of the predation strategy. These evidences help the predator in the sense that it 
enables competitors believe in the strategy. 
Finally, the entrants have to know that other competitors exit the market because of the 
predatory activities of the incumbent firm. Otherwise it can enter the market, if it believes that 
the older ones have operated not as much effective as itself. But when the reason of the exit 
decision is the predatory strategy, the new competitor will be discouraged for entry, as it sees 
that it will get economic harm by low market profitability when entering the market. 
In the equilibrium Kreps and Wilson (1982) have shown that, when asymmetric 
information is introduced in this game, even a weak incumbent will choose to fight the entry 
by creating a reputation effect and new firms will stay out of the market. Towards the end of 
the game, the weak incumbent may give up pretending as a “tough” one, and some firms can 
enter the market, but still uncertainty from the entrants’ point of view will continue as if the 
incumbent can be a real tough one. 
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2.1.2.3 Signalling Models 
 
Signalling models are similar to the reputation models in the sense, that they also deal 
with imperfect information, but in these models uncertainties about the cost and production 
structure of the firms have been introduced. In markets with imperfect information, signaling 
may enable a predator to mislead its rival into believing that market conditions are 
unfavorable, even when they are not. Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) have developed the first 
signalling model in economic literature. In their model, the entrant only observes prices set by 
the monopolist incumbent. It revises its expectations about whether the incumbent is a weak 
or strong one. For the entrant it is a profitable strategy to get into a market with a weak 
incumbent. But the entrant only knows that with some probability it will face the weak 
incumbent, thus it has to decide under uncertainty.  
Solutions to this model involve two equilibria, one separating and one pooling 
equilibrium. In separating equilibrium case, weak and strong incumbents set different prices. 
On one hand the strong incumbent sets a price lower than the monopoly price – even lower 
than its costs- , signaling efficiency. On the other hand, the weak incumbent will charge 
monopoly price. In this case the entrant will surely know which type of incumbent it faces 
and decides accordingly. When the incumbent is weak, it will choose to enter, otherwise not. 
In the pooling equilibrium case, both type of incumbents charge monopoly price. In the first 
type equilibrium, the low price charged by the incumbent can be interpreted as predatory, but 
it does not decrease welfare in total, as consumers will face monopoly price in the second 
period and the firm truly signals its cost structure. In opposition to it, pooling equilibrium 
decreases total welfare, when there is only a weak incumbent instead of a strong one. A weak 
incumbent will sacrifice its current profits, in order to recoup its losses in the second period. 
In these models, both cost levels can be advantageous depending on the setting. Low 
cost of the incumbent is an advantage as other competitors will not enter in the market, when 
the incumbent signals its cost structure. But in a game, in which entrants assume that they will 
have similar (or identical) cost structure to the incumbent, they can deter entry, when the 
incumbent signals, that it bears high costs. Because in an oligopolistic market structure, 
higher costs are related with lower profits, new firms will not choose to enter the market. 
(Harrington 1986) 
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Another signaling model has been introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). The 
“signal-jamming” model consists of two periods and it is assumed, that the incumbents’ 
characteristics are common knowledge, whereas the entrant has to build its expectations on 
future profits from current returns, not on cost levels. The entrant does not know the value of 
the fixed costs and is not certain about them in the second period as well.  As the result, 
predation in the first period will cause to the entry of some firms, but less than compared to 
complete information case. In this type of games, entrants try to obtain the level of demand, 
but the predator misleads them, by pretending as there is less demand than expected under 
normal condition. So again under imperfect information, firms that possible will enter the 
market under complete information, will be deterred from entry. Another point to mention is 
that (373) lower prices in this model can be below or above marginal costs of the incumbent, 
so it will be a better strategy not to use Areeda- Turner test, in order to determine predatory 
price.  
A related model is test market predation. In the test market predation models, the 
entrant tries to enter a market with a new product, where the incumbent has an established 
brand. The entrant can choose to enter a smaller “test” market, in order to learn the market 
characteristics and its products demand. Market conditions are unknown to the entrant, but the 
incumbent has adequate information. Thus the incumbent will set predatory prices in the test 
market, such that the demand for the new product will be less. The entrant will think that the 
demand for its product is low in this market and will deter entry.  (Scharfstein, 1984)  
These models have in common the existing uncertainty for existing market conditions. 
They try to give proper solutions, when players do not know different characteristics of the 
market and show that under uncertainty predatory pricing can be profitable for the incumbent. 
 
2.1.2.4  Financial Market Predation 
 
The theory of financial market predation is another tool by analyzing the situation under 
imperfect information. Although it is similar to “deep pocket” theory, it helps to explain why 
a firm could not find a creditor; even both sides will gain at the end. “Deep pocket” theory 
assumes that the incumbent has greater resources, which it can use in the predatory period to 
survive, whereas the entrant does not have this chance, if it does not borrow from another firm 
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or financial institution. In financial market predation models it is explained that the reason of 
the limited funding capability of the entrant is endogenous, meaning that under asymmetric 
information the creditor can not be sure about the cost and effort structure of the firm. When 
the incumbent charges predatory prices, the entrant will get lower or no profits. Normally in 
such a case the financial institution refrains from giving credits, thus the predator will recoup 
its losses, when it operates as a monopoly. 
In these models, again the main point is imperfect information. The creditors can not 
know the existing conditions in the market. Thus they can not know surely, why the entrant 
incurs losses. It can be because of the predatory activities of the incumbent firm or of the 
inefficient use of the firms’ resources. So lenders sign contracts depending on the amount of 
firms’ internal assets, limiting funding capabilities of the firms. In this context, again 
incumbent firm will be able to get more financial resources and with these new financial 
resources it will continue its predatory strategy more aggressively. As the result, entrants will 
deter entry, as they can not get enough financial support to survive the predatory period. 
From another point of view, even if lenders have enough knowledge about the market, 
and support the entrant in every possible condition (even when it incurs losses) by announcing 
it publicly, the entrant may fail to operate efficiently and use its resources for production. 
Thus, creditors will find also this strategy not optimal, as they can not assure the use of the 
given credit. Because of moral hazard problem between the principal (lenders) and the agent 
(entrants) predation can take place in imperfect financial markets. 
 
2.2 Criteria for predatory pricing 
 
Generally, competition authorities try to detect cases, where predatory pricing practices 
hinder competition in the market and thereby hurt consumers. The exact nature of the analysis 
depends on the characteristics of the legal framework, but in general competition authorities 
also consider several different criteria, mainly defined on quantitative measures. The most 
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important ones are market structure and firm’s position in the market, cost-price relation, 
recoupment possibilities and intention of the firm.i  
 
2.2.1 Dominant Position of the Firm 
 
In general it is expected that a firm has to be in a dominant position in the defined 
market, when it aims to be price setter. Otherwise its impact on the general price level in the 
market will not be continuous and effective, thus the predatory exercise can not achieve its 
aim. Different indicators such as market share, economic strength and excess capacity of the 
predator firm can be counted as indicators of the dominant position of the firm. Competition 
authorities in different countries and regions stress different indicators more. For an example, 
in the US market share is an important indicator in assessing the dominant position, whereas 
in the European Union it is also possible to see cases, where firms with smaller market share 
are involved in predatory pricing activities. Thus it can not be said that a single criteria is 
more important than the other ones, their weights differ in analyzing the cases and taking 
decisions. 
In most cases, dominant position of a firm in a market has been analyzed according to 
its market share. It is assumed that a firm with greater market share will easily set or affect the 
price level, as it can support its pricing decision with greater supply of the product. Other 
smaller firms will have to adjust their strategies according to this decision, as they do not have 
enough capacities to supply the whole market. As a result, the predator’s greater market share 
enables pricing decisions to be more effective, both in the supply and price level sides. Also 
the ratio of other firms’ market shares to the predator one is important. As the difference 
between the markets shares of the firms increases, their competition and negotiation power 
decreases in general. So the predatory prices exercised by the incumbent firm will be more 
effective. (Hovenkamp 1999, 347-348) 
 
                                                             
i This section draws on EKDI, B. (2003, ” Gümrük Birliği Çerçevesinde Damping ve Yıkıcı 
Fiyat Uygulamaları”) and KARA, A. (2003, ” Hakim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması Aracı 
Olarak Yıkıcı Fiyat Uygulaması ABD ve AT Uygulamalarından Dersler”) 
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When the incumbent lowers its prices below the competitive level, the demand for the 
product will increase. So the firm must have enough production capacity to meet the 
increased demand in the market. If its capacity is less than the new market demand, this 
strategy would not be successful, as the consumers will buy the product from other suppliers 
even at a higher price, so other competitors will be not injured by predatory prices and will 
continue to operate in the market. The predator’s ability, immediately to increase the 
production level, depends on the excess capacity of the firm. If it does not have enough excess 
capacity, it will have to invest in production facilities.  
Williamson (1977) incorporated the dominant position and production capacity of a 
firm into the predatory pricing analysis. He argued that since pre-entry and post-entry 
predatory pricing strategies differ from each other, alternative criteria must be used for the 
analysis and suggested a set of rules for controlling both output level of dominant firms and 
pricing strategies of all firms.  
Before other competitors enter the market, firms that already operate in the market 
could invest in production capacities and increase output level, causing a price decrease 
without violating Areeda- Turner rule. Before the entry period, incumbent can invest in 
excess capacity, as a threat to entry, and until entry it can reduce output level and increase 
price, leading to higher profit. But according to this new proposed rule the incumbent can not 
expand its output level, even if it has sufficient capacity, in response to entry for a period of 
12-18 months. (OECD, 1989, 22) In this time period entrants can gain customers and 
experience without facing predatory activities. In addition to that also when prices are greater 
than average variable costs, the dominant firm has to reduce its output level until prices 
decrease to its competitive level. Williamson argues that under this simpler operating rule 
efficiency will be greater both before and after entry. Furthermore he proposed that long run 
average cost level has to be used in cost-based pricing rules. Otherwise even equally efficient 
competitors could be deterred entry, as they have to incur fixed costs, which they can not 
recover when prices are equal to average variable costs. 
McGee and Areeda and Turner have criticized these rules especially in terms of output 
criterion. McGee (1980, 307-316) argued that after entry of new firms in the market 
incumbent will choose to co-operate rather than fight, thus even the incumbent has excess 
capacity it will not use them.  
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2.2.2 Pricing Strategy 
 
When markets operate competitively, under normal conditions it is expected that the 
inefficient firms will be driven out of the market. But firms charging lower prices can aim to 
injure competition in the market. Thus, to find out the real reasons behind lower pries 
becomes the main issue for a proper evaluation. It could be that the incumbent operates more 
efficiently and this will be favored for the competition. But also it could be the result of 
predatory pricing activities of the firm. At this point, the relationship between costs and prices 
become important and it needs to be analyzed properly. 
When analyzed historically in the early years of the Robinson-Patman Act, smaller 
firms have been protected from discriminatory price cutting exercises done by large firms. 
But no special interest was taken for the reason of low prices, although low prices could be 
the result of competition and will be in interest of consumers. In 1975 after the publication of 
the Areeda-Turner article, also courts began to analyze this relationship depending on a 
certain standard based on sales below average variable cost (AVC), which does not depend on 
fixed costs of the firm. Over succeeding years critics to Arena- Turner rule have been 
charged. They argued, that predatory prices can also be viewed as the result of the strategic 
interaction in the market (not aiming to let other competitors to exit), thus an effective control 
mechanism requires to consider strategic factors and long-run welfare effects. (Posner, 1979, 
925-942)  Thus alternative, improved rules have also been proposed by economists. In the 
next two sections, the basic standards will be explained in detail.  
 
2.2.2.1 Price under AVC 
 
Under perfect competition, price of a product or service is assumed to be equal to its 
marginal cost and it is assumed that firms will make zero profit. To decrease prices below 
marginal cost levels –even for a short time period- is not a rational strategy for a firm, because 
since the firm can not cover its costs in such a setting, it will incur losses, even if it sells more 
units. Prices under marginal cost level will be considered as the result of market power of the 
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firm, because in order to make profits in the long run, it has to increase prices above the 
competitive level and to affect the price level it has to be in dominant position. But the 
problem with this argument arises with the definition of marginal cost. If the cost level can 
not be defined properly, the analysis will lead to wrong results. Areeda and Turner (1975) 
suggested that marginal cost is mainly a function of variable cost. Hence they argue that short 
term average variable costs of a firm can be used to test for predation instead of its marginal 
costs. 
 
2.2.2.2 Price between AVC&ATC 
 
To analyze price levels between average variable cost and average total cost for 
predatory pricing came out mainly as a result of criticisms against Areeda-Turner rule. It is 
stated that average variable cost was very difficult to determine and short-term cost tests were 
not adequate to determine predatory pricing. Also the evidence showed that the Areeda- 
Turner rule was “a defendant’s paradise.” Thus in most cases an augmented Areeda- Turner 
rule has been adopted instead of the classic one. This new formulation included cost-based 
presumptions, intent and market structure. (Bolton and Riordian, 2000, 2253) By using this 
formulation, courts adopted that a price below average variable cost was presumptively 
unlawful, while a price above average total cost was conclusively lawful. In Bolton and 
Riordian (2000,2253) it is clearly stated as “A price falling between these two cost 
benchmarks was presumptively lawful, but the presumption could be rebutted by evidence of 
intent and market structure.” Factors other than price-cost tests are weighted differently in 
several courts. In some cases, evidences of the firms’ intention are stressed more than the 
existing market structure, sometimes the reverse occurs. But in general the main point is that 
even a price above average variable cost level can be considered as predatory price under 
special conditions.  
In accordance with these two types of cost criteria, there are two types of cost based 
analysis, one depending on short term costs and one depending on long term costs. Both types 
try to use accurate rules and to give explanations for predatory pricing cases, but they have 
their own advantages and disadvantages.  
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As stated above, the most known test for the short term cost based analysis is developed 
by Areeda and Turner (1975, 688-689). In their article they stated that a firm can not be 
accused of predatory pricing if it tries to maximize its profits in the short run. As known short 
run profit maximization requires marginal cost to be equal to marginal revenue, which equals 
its price under perfect competition, thus  price below marginal cost can be considered as an 
indicator of predatory pricing. But as marginal costs are hard to calculate, Areeda and Turner 
suggested using average variable cost instead of marginal cost. The paper concludes that 
prices equal or higher than average variable cost have to be assumed as lawful, whereas prices 
below average cost level have to be considered as illegal. Afterwards Areeda and Turner 
modified these per se rules and argued that prices below average total cost level have also to 
be analyzed, in other words “for prices above average variable costs they replace the standard 
of per se legality with a presumption of legality.” (OECD, 1989, 21) This rule aims to protect 
firms, operating as efficient as the incumbent one. Although in some periods, this can lead to 
“limit pricing” or elimination of smaller firms, even if they could increase competition, 
because of disadvantages they have, this rule forces incumbent to operate more efficiently. 
There have been criticisms against Areeda and Turner’s cost test, as it misses long run 
effects of predation by analyzing only the short run performance of the firm. Posner (1976, 
191-192) proposed that long run marginal costs are a better test for predation than short run 
variable cost tests, as it includes post- predation period costs too. The incumbent can 
eliminate equally or more efficient competitors, by exercising predatory prices, and it would 
hurt competition, if smaller firms do not have enough financial resources to bear the burden in 
the short run. But if long run effects of predation are taken into account with a cost analysis, 
predation could became more obvious. 
Thereupon Baumol (1996) criticized using average total costs as an indicator for 
predatory pricing, because of the fact that in real life all plants produce several goods at the 
same time, thus average total cost of an single product can not be surely estimated. According 
to Baumol, all fixed costs that are not sunk yet, have to be added to the total costs and average 
costs have to be calculated afterwards. He states that a firm will exit the market when its costs 
related to production are arising. Thus by predatory pricing tests it will be more appropriate to 
use average avoidable costs instead of marginal costs, because in such a case equally efficient 
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firms will not be eliminated from the market. Average avoidable cost differs from average 
variable cost, by costs related to fixed assets, which can be avoided by producing less or 
selling more. Rental cost of an extra space in warehouse is added to variable costs, whereas 
not to the avoidable costs. When the firm produces less or sells more, it will not need this 
extra space, such that it will not pay for it. Because average avoidable costs only include costs 
of production, it will more appropriate to use this measure by cost analysis for more or less 
equally efficient firms.  
2.2.3 Intent 
 
Another criterion for detecting the aim of low pricing strategy is the analysis of the 
intention of the firm. The strategy of low prices can be simply the result of the market 
dynamics, or it can arise because of the incumbents’ aim to deter entry and get monopolistic 
profits in other periods.  
Intention of the firm, exercising extraordinary low prices, is an important factor in 
analyzing for predatory pricing. In his paper, Greer incorporated several factors including 
non-economic ones into the analysis of the firms intent. (Greer 1979, 247-248) According to 
his classification, some of non-economic components are threat mails and phone calls, notes 
and conversations about hurting competitors, secret financial reports of competitors, 
constraints on firms, working with competitors. Factors like selective price decreases, 
increases in the incumbents’ production capacity, intense advertisement, increases in raw 
material inventory, cost- price relationship, geographical borders and timing of charging low 
prices can be interpreted as economic components used for proving predatory pricing. But 
there have been some criticisms against non-economic factors. Motta (2004, 449) states that 
internal papers and conversations should not be taken very seriously, as in most firms’ 
headquarters such papers can be found. It will be better, to give more importance to economic 
factors by analyzing the intention of the firm. 
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2.2.4 Recoupment 
 
Recoupment is another important criterion for predatory pricing. In economics it is 
assumed that all agents behave rationally and try to maximize their profits. According to this 
assumption the incumbent, charging predatory prices, has to gain extra profits because of this 
activity, otherwise it will not be a rational strategy.. The predator can get higher profits 
afterwards, because of the increased market power or changes in market conditions.   
For the competition authority showing of probable recoupment suffices for a case, it 
does not seek proof of actual recoupment. The most likely reason for this practice is that when 
proof of actual recoupment has been required, the incumbent could delay the decrease in 
prices, until risk of suit vanishes, if it will be hard to explain that other economic conditions 
are reasons for the price decrease. But in general, the incumbent will exercise predatory prices 
after this period. (Bolton and Riordian, 2000, 2269) Also by the analysis of the case, the 
strategic theory and the post predation evidence have to be considered. The emphasis on these 
features differ between cases (e.g. cases with weak theoretically background need stronger 
post predation evidence, vice versa) but in all decisions both theoretical and post predation 
evidences have to be taken into account.  For the competition authority it will suffice, when 
after the predation period, the predator gets an increased ability to raise and maintain high 
prices, suggesting that, it will recoup its losses. In addition, when the incumbent can exclude 
its competitors or deter entry in the market with predatory pricing, it will result in having 
greater market share and ability to charge higher prices, thus again there will be evidence for 
recoupment.  Also in cases where predatory theory is persuasive, again post predation 
evidence must been shown, to get the verdict. 
 In order to sum up, by using theory and post predation evidences it can be concluded, 
that probable recoupment exits, without need of showing actual recoupment. When there is a 
strong theory of predatory pricing based on economic analysis, with evidences showing the 
consistency of the theory and post predation market structure and conditions, and showing the 
exclusion of the competitors because of below cost prices, it will be reasonable to interpret 
this phenomenon as probable recoupment.  
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Baumol stressed in his paper (1979) the importance of the ability to increase prices and 
its effects in post-predation period. He argued that the incumbent can decrease its prices in 
response to an entry, but it has to limit its price for a five year period at its predation level, 
even after the exit of competitors. If the firm increases price level before the end of five year 
period, without any significant increase in production costs, prices can be considered as 
predatory. As firms use predatory prices in order to get monopolistic profits afterwards, such 
a rule will limit the probability of recoupment of their losses. An advantage of this rule is that 
it does not require computing and control cost level of the firms, as it mainly does not aim to 
analyze price-cost relationship. Also by using this rule, firms equally efficient as the 
incumbent one will have a chance to operate in the market. As the incumbent has to include 
its long term costs, that equally efficient firms must also bear, by setting the price, and thus 
these new entrants can choose to enter the market. Although Baumol has proposed to fix price 
level for a five year period of time, there can be increases in price level in accordance with 
changes in cost and demand. But this can be criticized, as the predator can use this exception 
and increase its price level, even the conditions in the market do not need any adjustment. 
Thus, actions taken by the predator would have to be strictly controlled. Another problem can 
arise, when firms hesitate to decrease prices even if they have to, because of their fear of 
losing the ability to raise prices again. (OECD, 1979, 25) 
Another test for predatory pricing is proposed by Scherer (1976). Like Williamson, he 
suggested that analysis of predatory pricing must include factors surrounding the incumbent’s 
conduct, its intent and the consequences of its conduct beside cost based tests. He argues that 
applying only cost based tests can lead to overlook cases, which serve for long run efficiency 
maximization. Cost based rules cause the predator in holding excess capacity and charging 
price below marginal cost. But not every action taken by the dominant firm in the market can 
be interpreted as predatory, thus the circumstances including the intent of the incumbent and 
consequences of these actions have also to be analyzed. 
Phlips supported Scherer and introduced a “rule of reason” standard. He aimed to 
determine whether the conduct of the incumbent has caused the entrants to lose in the long 
run, using all available evidence at hand. According to his definition of normal competitive 
price (a non-collusive profit-maximizing oligopoly price), he states that the victim has to 
prove that the predators’ pricing scheme was the cause of negative profitability in the long 
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run. At the same time, the predator has to prove that it charges the non-co-operative 
equilibrium price in the market after entry of the new firms. A better justification will be if the 
incumbent can prove that prices charged do not imply foregone profits compensated by larger 
profits in other markets now or in the future. (OECD 1989,25) 
 
2.2.4.1 Characteristics of the market  
 
The probability of the success of predatory pricing also depends on the market 
characteristics, thus the predator needs to analyze barriers for entry and exit and production 
facilities other than theirs as well.  
As explained earlier the predator aims to recoup its losses with monopoly profits it will 
get after the predation period. But there arises a problem. As new firms see that they could get 
extra profits in this market, continuously new ones will try to enter. Thus it will be harder for 
the incumbent firm to set predatory prices, when entering market is easy and less costly for 
the new firms. In such a case, the incumbent can not get monopoly profits, as new firms will 
enter the market and it will have to fight and exclude them, there will be less probability to 
recoup its losses. The incumbent will set predatory prices, if and only if it can set 
monopolistic prices in the period, between the exclusion of the old competitors and entrance 
of the new ones and profits it earns in this period exceeds its losses. But inversely, when 
entering the market is costly and time consuming, the incumbent will more likely exercise 
predatory prices and to get monopolistic profits afterwards. (Joskow and Klevorick 1979, 
227-231). 
Another important feature in recoupment is the characteristics of production facilities of 
competitors. The success of predatory pricing also depends on other firms’ production 
capacities. The incumbent will fail in lowering prices, when the competitors sell their 
production facilities to new firms, willing to enter the market. In such a situation these new 
entrants will buy equipments –most probably- cheaper than their market price, and thereby 
they will get an advantage in fixed costs compared to the incumbent one. (Hovenkamp 1999, 
351). And as the total production capacity in the market continues to operate, the predator will 
not recoup its losses. But there can be also exceptions to it. When the competitors’ production 
facilities can serve for producing not only for differentiated goods, but also for more generally 
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used ones, it will increase the probability of operating the new firms in other markets, thus the 
incumbent will again get monopolistic profits. Or if there exists excess supply in the market, 
outsider firms will not be willing to buy the equipments, and the incumbent will not face any 
competition (Hovenkamp 1999, 351). 
The last technique proposed for testing predatory pricing came from Joskow and 
Kleworick (1979, 223) They argued that market structure is the main determinant in predatory 
pricing strategy and price cuts have to be analyzed differently in different markets. If for all 
price decreases in every market same tests have been applied, then it could arise two types of 
mistakes. First, according to the test results it can be stated that predatory pricing exists, 
where it does not. Second, reversely there can be cases where predatory pricing exists, these 
tests have not caught. Both types of mistakes will lead to economic inefficiency. Thus, 
Joskow and Kleworick proposed a two stage test technique, incorporating other tests 
explained before. According to this new approach, first the market in which firms operate has 
to be tested by analyzing three components: (a) short sun monopoly power of the firm, (b) 
conditions of entry and (c) dynamic effects of competitors and entrants. If the first part of the 
analysis shows no evidence about predatory pricing being a profitable strategy, then any price 
cut has to be considered as lawful. But if it can be stated that price decreases in this market 
leads to extra profits, then the second part of the test have to be applied.  
The second part of Joskow- Kievorik rule includes a number of cost based tests and 
elements from rule-of –reason approach. But the main difference form rule-of-reason 
approach is that intent becomes a relevant but not necessary factor. According to the cost 
based test results, prices under average variable cost have to be considered as predatory 
prices. Price levels between average variable and average total costs have to be presumed 
predatory, if the reverse has not been proved by the firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
3. US PRACTICES 
 
3.1 Legal Framework 
 
In US, antitrust legislations have been first stated in Sherman Act (1890), afterwards in 
Clayton Act and the Federal Commissions Act in 1914. But predatory pricing activities are 
analyzed under two different rules. First of them is the second part of the Sherman Act, which 
has been enacted in 1890. It stresses on the monopolization such that: 
 “§ 2 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2  
Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty  
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, 
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three 
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. “ 
 
In other words according to Sherman Act (2nd part), predatory pricing can be 
considered as a tool for monopolization attempts, thus it has to be punished. Although in 
Sherman Act conditions against monopolization attempts has not been clearly stated, in 
Spectrum Sports case, the Court summarized three conditions for predation: (a) predatory or 
anticompetitive activities, (b) intent for monopolization and (c) high probability of success 
(Spectrum Sports case, 1993, 890-91) 
Robinson Patman Act is the second rule that can be used in predatory pricing cases. It 
has been enacted in 1936 and includes some changes for price regulation rules in Clayton Act. 
In general it aims to deal with discriminatory pricing issues, thus it is more applicable in cases 
where predatory prices can be considered also as discriminatory prices. The main difference 
from the Sherman Act is that in Patman Act, the probability of hurting competition is 
considered as a sufficient condition for predation. Success probability of monopolization 
attempts is not necessiciated. 
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3.2 Historical Background 
 
In US, issues about competition and therefore competition laws have a long history. 
Laws about predatory pricing were on special interest, because it could easily affect firms’ 
entry and exit decisions to new markets. On the one hand, if the law contains strict rules about 
predation, even efficient firms can leave the market. On the other hand, if the law does not 
strictly define the boundaries for predation, firms will not be willing to enter price 
competition, such that it will result in inefficiently high level of prices in the market.  Thus 
the tone of the competition law is very important in predatory pricing cases. In US, examples 
of different cases have led to new applications of the laws by courts, such that US competition 
and predation laws have been evolved along time. Also, two different laws (Sherman Act -
2nd part- and Robinson Patman Act) show two different points of view for predatory cases 
and the evolution of US competition policy. 
Until 1970s, laws against predation have been thought as rules against monopolization 
attempts. But decisions of the courts about predatory pricing cases, were not based on 
economically sound arguments. Many firms have been separated into smaller independent 
entities, because they were afraid to be accused with monopolization charges, when their size 
increases. “Standard Oil” Case can be shown as an example of this era. In his article 
“Predatory Price cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J) Case”, McGee argued that the Standard Oil 
case was taken as an example for many other predatory pricing cases, because many people 
believed that Standard Oil became monopoly as a result of predatory prices it charged. (1958, 
137) In this period, some of price lowering activities have been interpreted as predatory 
pricing, even if they were results of competition. (Bolton, Brodley ve Riordan 2000, 14) 
According to Koller’s analysis of 95 court cases, only 23 cases can be interpreted in predatory 
pricing context, in which actual predation was attempted in seven cases (thirty percent) and 
succeeded in only four (seventeen percent). (Koller, 1972) 
Thus, resulting decisions of these cases were mostly in favor of litigants. In this era, 
criteria taken into consideration in courts were mostly competitive power of firms operating 
in the market, geographical price differences, prices below average total cost level and 
predatory intent. But it has been argued that the cost analysis was not done in much detail, 
which can lead to false conclusions.  
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Because of the critics about the criteria used in courts, and the confusion between 
predatory and competitive low prices, courts have tried to use sound economical arguments in 
their decisions. At this point Areeda and Turner rule about cost- price level analysis have been 
used as an important tool in decision taking process, because it introduced a per-se cost 
analysis. As explained in previous parts, Areeda and Turner proposed that only prices below 
average variable cost level have to be considered as illegal, prices between average variable 
and average total cost levels have to be considered as legal, until reversely proven. But these 
tests had also disadvantages. Calvani also stated that the main issue with this cost test is its 
application in real life. (Calvani, 1999, 5) Although cost criteria are  known, it is very difficult 
to collect related information and decide accordingly. Thus, as cost based tests do not 
incorporate market specific factors affecting price level decisions into analysis and short term 
cost analysis was not appropriate for all markets, courts have began to consider other factors 
like market structure in which firms operate, and intention of firms, along with cost analysis. 
In time, as explained above courts decisions depended on different factors, but after 
Brooke case these factors have been consolidated depending upon certain criteria. Before 
Brooke decision, according to Sherman Act the court looked for three conditions to exist for 
predatory pricing. These were the existence of predatory or anticompetitive agreements and 
concerted activities, intention for monopolization and high probability of success of these 
actions. High probability of hurting competition was the only argument, which Robinson 
Patman Act takes into consideration. But after Brooke decision, the court stated two 
conditions for predatory pricing cases, which are existence of below cost price level and 
probability of recoupment. Recoupment in this context includes all possible forgone profits 
and their interests. Thus in order to speak of predatory pricing, recoupment after the low price 
period must be highly probable. Nowadays, in US, low prices are considered as a predatory 
pricing case if and only if when prices increase after competitors exit the market and the 
predatory firm is able to recoup it losses in the market. Otherwise, low prices are mainly seen 
as the result of effectiveness and competition. Beside of these conditions, in some cases 
reputation effect is also considered as another factor for predatory pricing. Reputation effect 
plays an important role in entry decisions of new firms into the market, thus courts have taken 
this effect into consideration if market conditions enabled such kind of act.  
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3.3 Leading Cases 
 
In US history there are many different cases for predatory pricing, but here two cases –
Brooke and Matsushita- will be analyzed in detail. Brooke case can be considered as an 
important example in predatory pricing lawsuits. With the Brooke decision, proof of below-
cost pricing and proof or recoupment became necessary conditions for the analysis of 
predatory pricing. Thus, it can be said that Brooke decision created a new framework for 
predatory pricing analysis. 
Matsushita case is another important example, as it has brought a new point of view for 
the analysis of predatory pricing cases. In this case, the importance of the markets’ 
characteristics has been questioned. If the market, in which firms operate, is not appropriate 
for predatory pricing being a profitable strategy, then price decreases do not have to be 
examined for predation. In the next two parts, these two cases will be examined in more 
detail. 
 
3.3.1 Brooke 
 
The Brooke case (1993)  is important in US predatory pricing history, as it incorporated 
two main points – proof of recoupment and proof of below cost pricing-  into the big picture. 
The suit began with the complaint of Liggett (a.k.a. Brooke Group), a relatively small player 
in tobacco market in US with 2.3% market share. The company stated that Brown & 
Williamson  charged predatory prices in generic cigarettes market. In the US tobacco market, 
total demand decreased, but prices continued to increase. Liggett came with the idea of 
“generic” cigarettes, which are cheaper than branded cigarettes. Consumers reacted positive to  
this price change and the market share of generic cigarettes increased. Other firms,  R.J. 
Reynolds and Brown&Williamson, have chosen to adjust their prices according to this new 
strategy and in US tobacco market a price war has begun, which had ended with the suit. The 
court decided depending on the recoupment and proof of below cost pricing criteria, that 
prices can not be considered as predatory.  
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In Brooke Case, the court also analyzed two conditions for predatory pricing. One of 
them is price level below cost and the other one is recoupment probability. The first condition 
has been previously analyzed before Brooke case. But the second condition, which can be 
stated as proof of recoupment, was a new condition added to the analysis. Proof of 
recoupment requirement is an important condition in differentiating predatory pricing from 
other anticompetitive predatory actions. In the Brooke decision it is clearly stated as:  
“Recoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing scheme; it is the 
means by which a predator profits from predation. Without it, predatory pricing produces 
lower aggregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced. Although 
unsuccessful predatory pricing may encourage some inefficient substitution toward the 
product being sold at less than its cost, unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to 
consumers.”( Brooke Decision, 509 U.S. 224).    
 
 The proof for recoupment will be two sided, such that firms charging predatory prices 
have to be able to increase their prices afterwards in order to cover their losses in predatory 
period and get additional gains. But the court also stressed that recoupment probability also 
depends on the market structure in which firms operate. Thus, it will be better, if at first 
market conditions such as entry barriers, market concentration, etc... have been analyzed. 
After this analysis, the case will be analyzed in detail, if market conditions enable firms 
recoup their losses. Otherwise it would not make any sense to argue about the case, if market 
conditions are not in favor of predatory pricing. Afterwards, two conditions have to be 
checked. There can be high probability of actual predation, if prices above competitive level 
could be charged after predation period. Or as a result of the firms’ increased market power 
recoupment could be possible with high probability. This new point of view has been also 
explained in Brooke decision: 
“Evidence of below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit an inference of probable 
recoupment and injury to competition. Determining whether recoupment of predatory 
losses is likely requires an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and a close 
analysis of both the scheme alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the 
relevant market....If market circumstances or deficiencies in proof would bar a reasonable 
jury from finding that the scheme alleged would likely result in sustained 
supracompetitive pricing, the plaintiff’s case has failed. In certain situations— for 
example, where the market is highly diffuse and competitive, or where new entry is easy, 
or the defendant lacks adequate excess capacity to absorb the market shares of his rivals 
and cannot quickly create or purchase new capacity—summary disposition of the case is 
appropriate.”( Brooke Decision, 509 U.S. 226).    
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The court interpreted low prices without recoupment probability as a consumer welfare 
enhancing tool, and decides accordingly. Thus, it tried to find and to evaluate cases with 
actual predation suspect, which will harm competition and welfare in the society. 
 
3.3.2 Matsushita 
 
In Matsushita Case, National Union Electric Corporation (NEU) and Zenith have 
accused 21 Japanese corporations or Japanese-controlled American corporations that 
manufacture and/or sell "consumer electronic products” (primarily television sets) with the 
argument that they charge predatory prices in order to exclude domestic manufacturers. They 
argued that these Japanese firms charged monopolistic prices in their own countries, in order 
to compensate their losses in US market, for 20 years long.  They also added that, if this 
predatory strategy could be successfully ended, then consumer welfare would be hurt by 
monopolistic prices, which will be charged by Japanese firms. 
In 1986 US Supreme Court has reached a verdict and rejected the arguments of US 
companies. In the decision, it has been argued that even after “20 years long predatory pricing 
period“, total market share of Japanese companies have not reached half of the market, 
whereas two US companies operate as first and second firms in the market. In such a situation 
it can not be the case, that predatory prices are executed as an abuse of dominant position 
power. In addition to this argument, the court stated that the market, in which firms operate, 
was a technology oriented market with fast changing environment characteristics and was not 
appropriate for predatory pricing. Even if the market was an appropriate one for abuse of 
dominant position, Japanese firms had not achieved the dominant position in 20 years and 
there was not any meaningful clue, to take the dominance in the market in another 20 years. 
As a result, they could not get monopolistic profits if they could not dominate the market, so 
there was not a probability of recoupment. US firms could not show any evidence about an 
anticompetitive collusive agreement between firms or about a conspiracy against them.  
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4. EU PRACTICES 
 
4.1 Legal Framework 
 
In European Union, competition policy and articles are based on articles of Rome 
Treaty. One of the basic aims of European Union is “the establishment of a system ensuring 
that competition in the internal market is not distorted.” (Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty) Thus, 
special articles against anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices of firms and 
governments have been established. To summarize shortly, Article 81 of the EC Treaty is 
mainly against anticompetitive actions and collusive agreements between firms. It states that: 
 “…all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market… “ 
All horizontal and vertical agreements are considered under this article, but exceptions 
are also taken into consideration in the 3rd part of the Article, as some agrements (Ex: 
aggrements for R&D joint ventures) may improve consumer welfare, although it can also hurt 
competition. Thus in Article 81(3) special cases have been introduced, for which Article 81(1) 
will ve exempted. These were:  
 “….which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, and which does not:  
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives;  
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. “ 
Article 82 of the Economic Treaty is about abuse of dominant position. It can be 
interpreted as  the base of  the situational analysis. In this article, which predatory pricing 
activities have to be prohibited, has been described. In Article 82 of the EC Treaty it is stated 
that: 
 “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
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(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts” 
Especially part (a) of the Article 82 can be associated with predatory pricing cases. It 
clearly states that unfair price levels will not be accepted and thus punished. 
There are also two more articles about competition. Article 86 deals with the application 
of competition policy to state institutions and Articles 87-89 deal with the regulation of state 
funds given to third parties. 
 
4.2 Historical Background 
 
In European Union, rules and regulations against anticompetitive actions of firms were  
passed into law much later than US. In accordance with this time gap, it can be said that 
European authorities have not changed their approach as much as US did. Mainly their 
emphasis laid upon strategic behaviour of the predator firm and its intent. To this extent in the 
decision process, the authority involved in an detailed analysis including qualitative and 
quantative factors instead of an purely per se price-cost analysis. Reputation and financial 
characteristics of the firm, internal messages can be listed within these factors. In light of the 
points stated above, it can be supposed that European Commission is following modern 
theory than classical one. 
In recent decisions this approach became more visible, as the authority tried to question 
the necessity of indicators which it took into consideration in predatory pricing cases. In Tetra 
Pak and Wanadoo cases, it became obvious, that the Commission did not take recoupment as 
an necesary precondition for predation contrary to US experience. Also in cost analysis, 
European Commission refrained to apply a per se price cost test. In AKZO case it aimed to 
implement an approach including both cost and intent analysis. (AKZO decision, para 74) 
The cost test is based on the assumption, that prices above average total cost levels can not be 
considered as predatory, but prices between average variable costs and average total costs can 
be thought as predatory, if the firms’ intent supports this predation argument. Thus, even in 
cost analysis, the decision depends on the intent of the firm. In general, it can be concluded 
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that the Commission aims to analyse every case depending on its own structure and needs, an 
approach closer  to modern theory. 
 
4.3 Leading Cases 
 
Although in Europe competition history is shorter than US history, there are also 
important cases, which are used as reference to other suits. In this part three cases – AKZO, 
Tetra Pak and Wanadoo- will be analyzed in detail. AKZO, as the first one of these three 
examples, can be considered as the milestone of predatory pricing decision. It can be said that 
AKZO decision is a referral point for cases afterwards, as it clearly shows the reasoning steps 
of competition authority in the decision process of predation cases. Tetra Pak case is a good 
example for comparison of US and European point of view in predatory pricing analyses. It is 
also important for understanding the significance of existing circumstances, at which 
predation occurs. In Tetra Pak, objection of the firm with the referral to AKZO case has not 
been considered as reasonable, although both cases were analyzed by the same authority 
under same rules. Thus, it can be concluded that qualitative factors of cases are important in 
the decision process. Wanadoo case is one of the most recent cases about the predatory 
pricing issue. It is an interesting case as it deals with predatory pricing for ADSL-based 
Internet access retail services for the general public. In the decision the authority expresses its 
opinion about the key indicators of predatory pricing by not evaluating recoupment as a 
necessary precondition of predatory pricing. In next three parts, these cases and decisions will 
be analyzed and their reasoning will be interpreted. 
 
4.3.1 AKZO 
 
ECS/AKZO decision is one of the most important predatory pricing cases in European 
Union, as it clearly shows important points in the analysis of European Competition 
Committee for predatory pricing cases. The case arose in 1979 with the complaint of ECS 
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(Engineering and Chemical Supplies (Epsom and Gloucester) Ltd ), that AKZO Chemie BV 
charged predatory prices in UK flour market, what ECS could not follow. 
At the beginning of 1980s, in United Kingdom three firms (AKZO, ECS and Diaflex) 
were operating in the organic peroxide (benzoyl peroxide) market. Their market share in 1982 
were %52  (for AKZO), %35 (for ECS) and %13 (for Diaflex). ECS sold its entire production 
as a flour additive in the United Kingdom and Ireland, whereas AKZO operated in whole 
Europe and sold its products to plastic producers as well. AKZO’s market share was above 
50% not only in United Kingdom flour additives’ market but also in Europe plastics’ market. 
In 1979, ECS began to trade with plastic producers in other countries and as its major 
competitive AKZO threatened ECS with below pricing strategy in UK flour additives market, 
which is main market of ECS’s production and revenues.  
The Competition Authority have taken into account other factors than prices by decision 
process. Written documents belonging to AKZO, market condition, competition strategy of 
AKZO are other factors analysed among cost structure, pricing strategy and dominant 
position of AKZO. In cost analysis, AKZO stated that it charged competitive prices between 
average variable and average total cost level, and proposed to use Areeda and Turner test in 
this case. But the Commission rejected this proposal and declared that it does not incorporate 
long term objectives into account, and only focuses on short term efficiency concerns. The 
authority clarified that even prices above average total cost can be evaluated as predatory, if it 
can damage competition in the long run. (AKZO Decision, para 75-79) AKZO limits its price 
reduction strategy only in United Kingdom flour additives market not all to the European 
plastics market, because AKZO aims to harm ECS and decrease its power. At the end, with 
this pricing strategy AKZO’s total revenues would not be affected as much as ECS.  This 
argument shows that European Competition Authority is more likely to follow modern 
economic theory in the case of predation, as it considers different measures for cost analysis. 
Another important factor in this case was the dominant position of AKZO in both 
markets. Although its market share is a sufficient indicator for its dominant position, other 
characteristics of AKZO serve as signs of dominance. With its huge production capability, 
AKZO had organizational and know- how advantages compared to smaller competitors. Even 
in recession periods it had the power to increase its prices, whereas other firms could not 
compete as they did not have the same product portfolio. In addition to that, in former periods 
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new entrants in plastics market could not compete with AKZO, as it charged prices below 
competitive level during the entry period. (AKZO decision, para 69) The last argument can be 
evaluated as “reputation effect”. It can be said that the competition authority took reputation 
effect also into consideration, although the term is not clearly stated in the decision. Also the 
choice of the market definition supported this idea. In this case, the market is defined as the 
whole plastics market instead of flour additives market in United Kingdom. According to the 
committee, the main aim of AKZO was to protect its dominant position in plastics market, 
where profit margins are much higher than flour additives market. Thus, in order to protect 
long run profits, it became important stopping ECS to operate in plastics market. (AKZO 
decision, para 46) 
The Commission aggregated all these arguments in an intent test, as there were 
disagreements between AKZO and the authority in cost analysis issue. Thus, the Commission 
tried to show dominant firm’s intention of predation. The written documents of AKZO against 
ECS, selective price reductions in flour additives market and prices below average variable 
cost charged by AKZO were arguments used in intent test by committee. At the end the 
authority decided that these were parts of a plan for elimination of ECS from plastics market 
and stated that AKZO was guilty for abuse of dominant position and predatory pricing.  
 
4.3.2 Tetra Pak II 
 
Tetra Pak case (1997) can be considered as another important example in the history of 
European Competition Authority. In this decision the difference between European and US 
points of view for recoupment in analysis of predatory pricing can easily be seen. The case 
arose with the complaint about the anticompetitive prices, Tetra Pak charged in Italian non-
aseptic cartons and machines market, in order to eliminate its competitors. Tetra Pak was 
worldwide dominant firm in aseptic and non-aseptic machines and cartons market. Its market 
share reached 92% in aseptic machines and cartons market, where it only competes with one 
company. For the aseptic market, also entry barriers strengthen the dominant position of Tetra 
Pak. (Tetra Pak, para 100) In non - aseptic markets, Tetra Paks’ market share was around  
40%, whereas its competitors Elopak and PKL have 27% and 11% market shares 
respectively. Again it can be concluded, that in general Tetra Pak is in dominant position in 
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non-aseptic cartons and machines markets. ( Tetra Pak, para 101) But for proving the 
dominant position of Tetra Pak, in the decision European Commission added that Tetra Pak 
used its dominance in aseptic markets as a tool for abuse in non-aseptic cartons and machines 
markets in Italy. (Tetra Pak, para 104) Thus, the case can be analyzed under Article 86 of 
Rome Treaty. 
In both aseptic and non-aseptic machines markets, Tetra Pak stipulated the usage its 
own cartons with its contracts, which can be seen as a sign its intent for monopolization of the 
market and abuse of dominant position. Tetra Pak’s financial strength is another advantage for 
monopolization attempts, as it can tolerate greater losses than other firms. At this point, 
predatory pricing became a reasonable strategy, as competitors could not survive losses, 
which arose because of below cost pricing strategy. The competition authority analyzed the 
situation in Italy and United Kingdom markets and concluded that Tetra Pak was considered 
guilty of predatory pricing.  Tetra Pak raised an objection against the decision with the 
argument that the court has to prove its intent for predation, as it did not have recoupment 
probability afterwards. However European Commission rejected this argument by saying that 
recoupment requirement would not be appropriate in the circumstances of the present case, as 
the firms’ intention can easily be concluded from its six year long pricing strategy, as it could 
not serve any other economically reasonable explanation than predation. ( Tetra Pak, para 
150) US and European Committee decisions differ at this point, as in US decisions 
recoupment probability is taken more seriously into consideration. But at this point it is also 
important to highlight that European Commission may well include the recoupment test under 
different conditions, although it does not necessitate questioning it in all cases. 
 
4.3.3 Wanadoo 
 
In July , 2003 the European Commission declared that Wanadoo Interactive charged 
predatory prices for ADSL-based Internet access retail services for the general public between 
March 2001 and October 2002. Wanadoo Interactive is part of the France Télécom group, 
which is a %56 state owned company. In France Wanadoo operated in  ADSL-based high 
speed Internet services and cable based access services markets. Between January 2001 to 
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September 2002, Wanadoo's market share rose from 46% to 72%, on a the ADSL-based high 
speed Internet access services market. At this period also the market grew more than four 
times under Wanadoo’s dominance. In the decision process, the Commission investigated at 
first the dominance argument, what is true obviously. Then, as the second move, it analysed 
the cost structure of Wanadoo’s services and the relation between costs and prices. It came 
out, that Wanadoo charged prices below average total cost level. In the decision it is stated 
that in such markets firms can bear recovery costs, which is defined below: 
“This approach is based on the consideration that it is not the firm's objective to 
produce an instantaneous profit. Rather the firm will seek to achieve a level of 
recovery of recurrent costs (network costs and production costs) which is sufficient to 
ensure that the margin between revenue and recurrent costs will, within a reasonable 
time, also cover the non-recurrent variable costs invested in the commercial 
development of the particular product, on items such as advertising, promotion, 
marketing etc. The non-recurrent variable costs are accordingly adjusted and spread 
over a certain period in line with the principle of the depreciation of assets.” (Para 76) 
 
But even after cost tests for recovery are applied, it has been recorded that Wanadoo’s 
intent for predation was undoubtful. In addition to that indirect proofs for the predation intent 
of Wanadoo such as internal documents are citated in the decision. For the recoupment case 
the Commission followed the same approach in Tetra Pak case, which supposes that 
recoupment is not a necessary precondition for proof of predation. Thus the dominant firm 
has to prove that it can not recoup its losses in order to show its innocence, otherwise it can be 
accused with predation. As all findings indicate the abuse of dominance and existence of 
predatory prices the European authority charged a fine of €10.35 million on Wanadoo 
Interactive. 
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5. TURKISH PRACTICES 
 
 
5.1 Legal Framework 
 
In Turkey, the main law concerning anticompetitive practices have been published in 
1994 in official gazette, in other words only 14 years ago. Main purpose of this law is as 
stated in Article 1 of the 4054th section of Turkish Constitutional Law: 
 “The purpose of this Law is to provide the protection of competition by ensuring 
necessary regulation, supervision and the prevention of abuse of dominant 
position by those enterprises which are dominant in the market and the 
agreements, decisions and practices which prevent, restrict or distort competition 
within the markets for goods and services.” 
 
It serves to ensure competition in all markets and includes measures against 
anticompetitive actions. (Law 4054, Article 2) In article 4 of the same law, practices against 
competition have been described. Exemptions to these practices have been stated in article 5, 
for which these provisions are not relevant. Abuse of dominance have been analyzed as a 
different issue and explained in Article 6. In this article it is stated that: 
 “Any abuse, by one or more enterprises acting alone or by means of agreements 
or practices, of a dominant position in a market for goods and services within the 
whole or part of the territory of the State, is unlawful and prohibited. 
Abusive practices are, in particular, as follows: 
a) To prevent, directly or indirectly, other enterprises in its area of 
commercial activities or practices which aim to impede the activities of the 
competitors in the market? 
b) To make discrimination, directly or indirectly, by way of imposing 
dissimilar conditions for equivalent and same rights and obligations to the 
purchasers who have equivalent position 
c)  To make the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance of 
restrictions concerning resale conditions such as the purchase of other goods and 
services or acceptance by the intermediary purchasers to display other goods and 
services or maintenance of a minimum resale price 
d) Practices which aim to distort competition in a market for goods and 
services by means of taking financial, technological and commercial advantages 
created by the dominant position in another market 
e) To restrict production, marketing or technical development thereby 
causing a disadvantage for the consumers. 
 
36 
 
Especially  parts (a) and (d) of the Article 6 can be incorporated with predatory pricing 
cases. It includes both dominant position abuse and emphasize on price effects of different 
types of abuse. It also clearly states that these activities are against competition and will be 
punished.  
The substantive rule about competition (Article 7) deals with mergers and acquisitions. 
It stresses that mergers and acquisitions are unlawful and prohibited, if they serve to 
strenghten or creation of dominant position in a market. 
 
5.2 Leading Cases 
 
Beginning from the issue date of the competition code, many cases have been brought 
against firms which have been involved in anticompetitive aggrements and concertive 
practices. Turkish Competition Law, used in analysis of the anticompetitive actions,  
resembles European Competition Law. In analysis of predatory pricing cases, Turkish 
authority investigates the four key indicators in following course. At first, economic 
dominance of the predator has been interrogated. If the firm is not dominant in its relevant 
market, the case is dropped immediately. Extraordinary low prices are questioned in the 
second stage, by using cost tests. A firm charging prices below its cost level, can be 
considered as predator, if there are also signs of intent for deterring entry of new competitors 
or expelling existing ones. The last indicator for predation is recoupment probability. Firms 
can be willing to bear losses, in order to gain above competitive level profits in later periods. 
The Turkish Board examines all predatory pricing cases in this framework, but there can be 
exceptions in the analysis according to the existing conditions. For example, a case can be 
considered as an example for predatory pricing, although the firm is not in dominant position 
in related market. 
 
5.2.1 Coca Cola Decision 
 
In this section, the predation suit of Coca Cola in 2004 will be analysed. The 
distribution company of Coca Cola has been accused with the complaint that it has practiced 
predatory pricing strategy in soda / soft drink market. The decision regarding this suit has 
37 
 
been an important one, in the sense that the authority has used all related economic analysis 
tools for the evaluation.   
The competition authority began its analysis with the definition of the related market. In 
the decision, it has been clearly stated that the related market has to include all substitutable 
goods and services. (“Coca Cola – Predation” (2004) Turkey Competition Board 04-07/75-18, 
pp.3) In order to define the characteristics of the goods sold in the soft drink market, and 
whether they are substitutable or not, the authority has used multiple regression analysis and 
Granger causality tests. (“Coca Cola – Predation” (2004) Turkey Competition Board 04-
07/75-18, pp.5) The results of both multiple regression analysis and Granger causality tests, 
showed  that the related market has to include soft drinks. Afterwards, the dominant position 
of Coca Cola in this related market has been questioned. Although Coca Cola was not 
dominant in soda market, it has been stated that in total soft drink market Coca Cola was the 
dominant player. In accordance with the analysis, other elements like relative market shares of 
firms, entry barriers to the market, brand power, financial strength, distribution channels have 
been analysed, before the cost structure study. The analysis has been ended with the cost – 
price analysis. The authority has decided, that this case could not be taken as predation 
according to the evidence.  
In its second defense, Coca Cola, has referred to the Michael Porter’s model. The 
degree of dependence to other firms has been evaluated  according to the five criteria, which 
are entry potential to the market, degree of competition, bargaining power of both consumers 
and producers and availability of substitute goods. (“Coca Cola – Predation” (2004) Turkey 
Competition Board 04-07/75-18, pp.25) The analysis of these five criteria show that Coca 
Cola depends on other companies in the market by taking pricing decisions. Thus, it is in a 
dominant position, when taking non- alcoholic hot drinks like coffee and tea into the market 
definition. But in its investigation, the competition authority clearly states that as hot drinks 
could not be substitutes for the defined product portfolio, they could not also been added to 
the related market, thus Coca Cola is the dominant player in the non-alcoholic soft drinks 
market. Although prices charged were mostly below average total cost level, it could not be 
interpreted as predatory prices in the specified soda market, as long as the intent for predation 
could not be proved. 
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Another interesting point in the defense of Coca Cola is that it includes the four main 
criteria used for predatory pricing analysis. It is declared that the competition authority in 
Turkey has been following EU’s practices and thus, it did not take recoupment criterion into 
consideration. (“Coca Cola – Predation” (2004) Turkey Competition Board 04-07/75-18, 
pp.34) In its decision, the authority accepted this point of view and investigated the suit 
according to three main criteria, but it also made additional comments on recoupment. (“Coca 
Cola – Predation” (2004) Turkey Competition Board 04-07/75-18, pp.44) As the reason for 
this decision, the problematic nature of the proof of recoupment has been shown. (“Coca Cola 
– Predation” (2004) Turkey Competition Board 04-07/75-18, pp.42)   
 
5.2.2 LPG Market Decisions 
 
LPG is used for heating, cooking in houses, as an energy source in industry and instead 
of fuel in automobiles. Because of these different utilization areas and purposes, it is supplied 
to the customers in different forms and packages. Thus, their respective markets also differ 
from each other. As in the decision process, the evidence of dominant position is an important 
factor in determining predatory pricing, at first respective market is defined. In Turkey, from 
1998 onwards there were three cases, with one involving two separate decision processes 
because of the rejection made to the Council of State after the first one. Suits mainly dealt 
with bottled gas and LPG forms used in automobiles, thus the authority investigated for the 
proof of the dominant position in these markets. 
In 1998, the first case in LPG market has been tied to a decision. The complaint was 
that seven LPG producing firms (Aygaz, Mogaz, Likidgaz, Milangaz, Milgaz, Ipragaz, 
Sihirgaz) charged price below cost in bottled gas market, with the intention to throw their 
competitors from the market. A local producer in Adıyaman sued them because of concerted 
practices, in which they were involved in order to be able to act as one dominant firm and to 
get monopolistic power in the market. The authority has defined bottle gas market as relevant 
market and Adıyaman as the relevant geography. The authority found out a meeting 
document, form which it can be obviously concluded that these firms aim to expel their local 
competitors from the bottled gas market with special discounts and below cost prices. 
(“Adıyaman – LPG Distribution” (1993) Turkey Competition Board 93/750-159, pp.20) In 
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addition to these findings it is stated that bottled gas were sold to the distributors below cost 
prices. The prices used in the analysis, were compared to the distributors’ costs, not to the 
production costs, which could not be appropriate from economic point of view. Another 
interesting point in the analysis was that the firms’ market shares were not studied in detail. 
The authority argued that the main problem in this case was concerted practices of these seven 
firms against local ones, not a direct abuse of dominant position. Thus for this case a detailed 
analysis for dominant position and price- cost comparison was not necessary. This decision of 
the authority was sent to council of state with the objection of sued firms and in 2005 the case 
was again evaluated by the competition committee. But at the end of this second evaluation, 
the decision did not changed and firms were obliged to pay a fine for their former strategy. 
(“Adıyaman – LPG Distribution/ 2nd decision” (2005) Turkey Competition Board 05-73/986-
273, pp.15,16) 
In 2002, second case came to the Competition Board for assessment. In this case, two 
firms (Demiroren and Milangaz LPG) were accused of predatory pricing and forming a cartel 
in filling gas for automobiles market. The geographic market is stated as Ankara, Kayseri, 
Trabzon and Sivas. Another accusation is that Milangaz charged higher prices for filling gas 
to POAS compared to prices charged to other competitors, what is leading to a decrease in the 
number of customers for POAS and hurting competition. In the analysis, the authority stated 
that the firm has to be in dominant position, in order to be accused with predatory pricing 
according to the 6th article of 4054. It can be said that dominance is a necessary precondition 
for predatory pricing charges. Like most cases, the evaluation began with the investigation of 
dominant position. The authority found out, that Aygaz was the dominant firm in the relevant 
market, and Demiroren Group followed Aygaz in market share. (“Demiroren- Milangaz LPG 
Distribution” (2002) Turkey Competition Board 02-48/611-246, pp. 6) Thus it can not be 
charged with predatory pricing indictment. For Milangaz’s anticompetitive prices, the 
authority declared that the prices charged to POAS have not differed in the specified period, 
only the internal prices of Milangaz were fallen, leading to a competitive advantage for 
Milangaz. But as Milangaz was not dominant firm in the markeft, it could not fulfill the first 
requirement for abuse, other elements were not questioned and the firm cleaned of all charges. 
(“Demiroren- Milangaz LPG Distribution” (2002) Turkey Competition Board 02-48/611-246, 
pp.7)  
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The last suit was again about bottled gas market. Demiroren LPG group was taken to 
court with the complaint that it charged predatory prices for 12 kg bottled gas in Konya. 
Again the authority looked for the dominant position of Demiroren in Konya bottled gas 
distribution services market. But as Demiroren did not have enough market share for 
dominance, accusations have been rejected by the authority without involving in cost analysis. 
(“Demiroren – Abuse of dominant position” (2006) Turkey Competition Board 06-13/150-35, 
pp. 3) 
 
5.2.3 Telecommunication Market Decisions 
 
In 2002, telecommunication services market consists mainly from two branches, basic 
services (infrastructure services, etc...) and added value services including mobile 
communication services, which is the growing segment with the introduction and increasing 
usage of mobile phones. In Turkey, Turk Telecom was the state monopoly for basic 
telecommunication services until recently. This segment has been taken into the privatization 
program by the state and Turk Telecom became a private company. By added value services 
market the picture changes. Turkcell is the leader firm in this market with several competitors 
like Avea and Vodafone. These two markets are tied to each other with the minimum fees 
charged for every mobile and home phone call and line usage between these firms. Turkish 
cases in telecommunication services market are mostly about the campaigns and fees charged 
by GSM companies, as it was the only branch in which competition exists. 
In telecommunication services market three cases have been tied to a decision in 2003. 
Two of them were about predatory pricing conduct of Aycell. In the first one, the issue was 
the minimum fee charged by Turk Telekom to its former partner Aycell. It is claimed that 
Turk Telekom differentiated its fee structure in advantage of Aycell, and charge lower prices 
for the calls between fixed lines and Aycell. Another argument was that Aycell could set 
predatory prices, as its costs decreases with this fee structure. Thus Turk Telekom and Aycell 
were accused because of dominant position and predatory pricing. In the analysis, the 
authority also questioned if Turk Telekom aimed to use its dominance power in the mobile 
communication sector with these pricing structure. In the decision it is stated that Aycell’s 
pricing strategy could not be described as predatory, since as a new firm it is not in dominant 
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position and could not aim to deter entry or to expel its competitors. The recoupment 
probability is also out of question, since it could not charge extraordinary high prices 
afterwards because of the competitive characteristics of the market. The fees charged by Turk 
Telekom have been investigated, too. The problem was that the minimum fees could not be 
lower than a specific amount (Birim Temel Ucreti, BTU), which is determined by the mobile 
communication services firms itself. Every firm in the market pays BTU for the calls between 
the lines of Turk Telekom and other GSM companies. Other GSM firms than Aycell have 
defined an equal amount for this fee, Turk Telekom could not charge lower prices to them. 
But as Aycell did not have specified a strict amount for it, Turk Telekom could charge lower 
fees. As BTU is paid to every single firm in the market (including Turk Telekom), it has been 
concluded that it could not be used as a predation tool. (“Turk Telekom – Aycell ” (2003) 
Turkey Competition Board 03-28/346-146, pp.5-6) According to these findings the authority 
decided to reject the accusations. (“Turk Telekom – Aycell ” (2003) Turkey Competition 
Board 03-28/346-146, pp.5-6) 
In the second case again Aycell was accused of predatory pricing. It has been argued 
that Turk Telekom involved in cross subsidy and used its power in basic services market, in 
added value services market for supporting Aycell. It is also added that Aycell’s tariffs for its 
corporate customers were predatory, which it can bear only with the financial support of Turk 
Telekom. In their analysis, the authority agreed in the argument, that as a partner Turk 
Telekom financially supported Aycell and covered its losses, with its revenues in the basic 
services market. The authority stated that Turk Telekom could be charged for cross subsidy, if 
it can be proven that Aycell followed predatory pricing strategy in added value market. (“Turk 
Telekom – Aycell – Predatory prices in GSM services market” (2003) Turkey Competition 
Board 03-56/655-301, pp.8) After this point, Aycell’s pricing strategy have been analysed for 
four indicators, which can be summarized as economic dominance, extraordinary low price, 
intent and recoupment. Although Aycell’s prices were far below its costs, it could not be 
considered as predatory, since other arguments indicate that Aycell uses this pricing strategy 
only to enter the market not to hurt its competitors. As a new firm, Aycell’s market share was 
lower than its competitors in the relevant market. Also, it was obvious, that Aycell aimed 
merely to gain new customers with this strategy, not to expel existing ones. As three of these 
preconditions did fail to exist, the authority decided to reject all charges against Aycell and 
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Turk Telekom. (“Turk Telekom – Aycell – Predatory prices in GSM services market” (2003) 
Turkey Competition Board 03-56/655-301, pp.8)  
In the third case in 2003, Turkcell proceed against Turk Telekom with the accusations 
of predatory pricing and price squeeze. Turk Telekom executed a three month long discount 
campaign, in which it discounted fees 50%, for abroad phone calls all day long and for the 
domestic phone calls within the time interval 20:00-08:00 of day. At the same time it 
increased the amount of the monthly rents for the services it supplied to other GSM and 
internet services firms by 5 %. Turkcell claimed that, Turk Telekom aimed to abuse its 
dominant position, and tried to offset its losses because of the campaign with its increasing 
rental revenue. For predatory pricing charges the authority compared the pricing structure of 
Turk Telekom with the ones of GSM firms. It became obvious that per minute fee for phone 
calls between fixed lines were much lower than between GSM and fixed lines even before the 
campaign period, which means that people will prefer to use fixed lines even before the 
campaign. According to this argument, it can be said that with the campaign it is mainly 
intended to increase the time for the existing phone calls between fixed lines, not to catch the 
customer base of GSM users. For the price squeeze accusation, the authority checked the 
price levels for the rental services in other countries, and found out that even the increased 
prices in Turkey were not lower than the average level of other countries. (“Turk Telekom – 
Rental line/ Cross subsidy” (2003) Turkey Competition Board 03-28/347-147, pp. 4) With 
these evidences the authority decided to drop the case. 
In the last and more recent case (“Turk Telekom – Abuse of dominant position” (2008) 
Turkey Competition Board 08-41/556-209) Turkcell was accused with abuse of dominant 
position. It is argued that in its special tariffs Turkcell violated the pricing rules set for added 
value market and charged predatory prices. In the decision process, the authority compared 
Turkcell’s tariffs with the ones of complaining firm. It came out that the complaining firms’ 
tariffs were much higher than from ones of Turkcell, although the cost structure of the 
complaining firm enabled to set lower prices. The authority agreed with the argument that 
Turkcell was the dominant company in the relevant market, but by looking the cost structure 
it concluded that complaining firm did not aim to compete in prices with Turkcell. As a result 
the authority decided that Turkcells’ lower prices would not complicate other firms’ presence 
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in the market or serve to elimination of the other firm from the market, thus the case has been 
dropped.  
 
5.2.4 Internet Services Market Decisions 
 
Internet services market can be divided into two parts, one deal with the infrastructure 
services to internet supplying firms and the other one deal with supply of internet service to 
end customers. It can be classified as a sub branch of telecommunication services market, 
because of the nature of services supplied. In most countries, internet services related 
infrastructure is owned by telecommunication companies, as both sectors use same equipment 
in their services because of the organizational efficiency. There were three cases for predatory 
pricing in Turkey. Especially one case is interesting; in the sense that the arguments resemble 
the Wanadoo case in the European Union. It is about prices of the internet services provided 
to end customers. A preliminary injunction has been issued, but the end decision for this case 
has not been published until today.  
In the first case, issued in 2002, Turk Telekom was targeted with the accusation of 
abuse of dominance and predatory pricing by providing infrastructure services to intermediary 
companies. It is claimed that Turk Telekom enforced intermediary internet services providers 
to rent VPOP (Virtual Point of Presence) infrastructure, which was provided by its partner 
company TTNet. VPOP usage would hurt competition, as all internet provider firms would 
serve same package with same benefits. Besides of this it is stated that Turk Telekom charged 
predatory prices to its corporate customers in broad band internet provision. In addition to 
these arguments, it is also argued that TTNet charged predatory prices to end customers, 
which is an anticompetitive strategy by itself. Infrastructure services for provision of internet 
were a monopolistic market in that time period, and in Turkey Turk Telekom operated as 
monopoly. The competition authority investigated for cross subsidy and predatory pricing 
arguments using a detailed cost analysis. After the cost analysis, it is declared that TTNet and 
Turk Telekom are charging below cost prices in both broadband and dial up internet services 
markets. Unlike to other examples the authority has not questioned intent and recoupment 
arguments, and decided that these prices were predatory. (“Turk Telekom – Abuse of 
dominant position in internet infrastructure market” (2002) Turkey Competition Board 02-
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60/755-305, pp.57-64) The authority rejected VPOP argument with the claim that VPOP 
usage served for efficiency in the market. (“Turk Telekom – Abuse of dominant position in 
internet infrastructure market” (2002) Turkey Competition Board 02-60/755-305, pp.59) Turk 
Telekom objected to this decision and applied to the state of council. In 2006, the competition 
authority issued a new decision, but its judgment did not change. It still argued that Turk 
Telekom was abusing its dominant position in both markets and has to be penalized for it. 
In 2007, TTNet again was accused charging below cost prices in internet providing 
services to end customers. The issue began with a campaign named “Yaz Fırtınası”. It is 
argued that the prices in this campaign were far below costs and TTNet abused its dominant 
position in this market. As being the dominant player in this market, TTNet was only 
questioned for below cost pricing. The committee implemented three different cost analyses 
for this case. In the first one, profit margins for each package provided in this campaign were 
analysed. Although extra costs like free modem provided to customers had not been added to 
this calculation, it became out, that the profit margin was positive only for two packages. It 
clearly showed that TTNet could not bear its losses with this campaign in short term. (“TTNet 
– Yaz Fırtınası” (2007) Turkey Competition Board 07-59/676-235, pp. 10) In the next step, it 
has been questioned whether if TTNet could offset its costs with these profit margins. Also at 
this step it has been concluded that to offset these costs seemed not possible. (“TTNet – Yaz 
Fırtınası” (2007) Turkey Competition Board 07-59/676-235, pp.13)  As the last step, long 
term cost analysis has been conducted. In this part, the authority referred to Wanadoo Case, 
and emphasized the similarity between two cases. Thus Turkish Competition Board  used a 
similar test structure including long term gains, but the result did not changed.  (“TTNet – 
Yaz Fırtınası” (2007) Turkey Competition Board 07-59/676-235, pp.13-14) After this 
investigation, the authority issued a temporary decision and stopped the campaign until the 
end decision has been declared. As a note, until now, the Competition Authority did not 
publish its final decision about this case.  
Another important case has been about the campaigns  “TumEvIsAvea320”, “Sirketler 
icin ADSL” done by TTNet and Avea, and “Ucretsiz Ev/Is Arama Fırsatı” done by Avea, 
respectively in internet services and telecommunication services markets. These two firms 
have been accused with abuse of dominant position, in the markets they operate. Charges 
including predatory pricing, cross subsidy, bundling and tying exercises and price squeeze 
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have been analysed by the authority. In the first part, related with campaigns 
““TumEvIsAvea320”, the competition committee admits that TTNet is dominant player in 
ADSL market. But it has been added that as the products promoted in these campaigns could 
also been bought independently, thus tying and bundling accusations could not be valid, 
which freed TTNet from charges. By the analysis, competition authority did not only include 
the position of  firms, it also investigated the cost structure of the products and other 
quantitative criteria like the number of participants to the campaign, the magnitude of 
discounts given to consumers, consumer preferences and related products characteristics. 
(“Avea – TTNet – Predation” (2008) Turkey Competition Board 08-57/912-363, pp.12-16)  
By the analysis of the other two campaigns, the authority checked for cross subsidy and 
price squeeze practices. It has been stated that cross pricing (subsidy) charges could be valid, 
if and only if there exists predatory pricing, thus predatory pricing argument has also been 
investigated. When analysed for predation, again other criteria then price – cost structure have 
been added to the picture. In the decision it has been stated that the campaign could not be 
evaluated as predation, as recoupment and intent criteria could not be affirmed by looking to 
the evidences. (“Avea – TTNet – Predation” (2008) Turkey Competition Board 08-57/912-
363, pp.44)  
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6. ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICES OF US&EU&TURKEY 
 
 
6.1 Intent- Recoupment 
 
Intent and recoupment are important key elements of predatory pricing as well as 
economic dominance and extraordinary low prices. As explained in previous chapters, in 
basic terms intent can be defined as the willingness of the dominant firm to deter its 
competitors with predatory prices. Recoupment on the other hand can be defined as the 
chance of offsetting losses occurred in predatory period with higher prices charged 
afterwards. Although it seems that they are closely tied together, the existence of intent does 
not always imply that recoupment strategy will succeed for sure. Hence, US and European 
competition authorities tend to consider both arguments separately. 
In the first period of US predation history, intent has been considered as an important 
proof for predation, but afterwards this perception changed. It has been claimed that some 
arguments in internal documents, which were mostly showed as proof of  intent, can be 
because of harsh competition as well as intent for predation. Thus, intent has been evaluated 
as a subjective argument. In addition to these statements, a firm, which would involve in 
predation, would act more carefully, in order to hide its true aim. (Bishop 1992, 3). Because 
of these reasons, US authority tends to incorporate recoupment into the analysis. Result of 
intent has been questioned in detail and the prices will be accepted as predatory if and only if 
recoupment will occur with high probability. Otherwise intent is accepted as a sign of harsh 
competition. Even if the predator aims to deter entry of other firms in the market and hurts 
competition, it will not be stated as predation without recoupment. Thus, US authority 
integrated intent analysis into recoupment and in a way eliminated it.  
As US competition authority’s decisions are more likely affected by the classical 
economic theory, which does not accept the existence of predatory pricing in real life. Thus, 
the authority tried to complicate to prove predatory pricing. By adding recoupment test into 
the picture, it expected from the plaintiff to prove the probability of getting profits in the long 
run as result of predation.  With this approach the cases were more likely to be rejected, as 
recoupment is a difficult factor to prove for sure.   
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The European authority appraised intent test as a tool for understanding the strategic 
behavior of the predator. A decision taken only after cost analysis will not be enough for 
determining the real aim of the dominant firm. AKZO case is an important example for 
showing the importance of intent analysis. By looking only at cost structure and prices, it 
could be concluded that AKZO had not been involved in predation, as it charged  prices 
higher than the average variable cost level. But the internal documents and strategic moves of 
AKZO in different markets indicated predation, as they all served nothing but to expel ECS 
from plastics market. Besides in European Union unlike US, proof of intent requires a 
systematic evaluation of economic and non-economic factors and depends not only subjective 
criteria. 
In European authority decisions, recoupment is not seen as a necessary precondition for 
proving predation. Unlike US, in EU experiences intent is taken more seriously into 
consideration, as it is assumed that predation can occur in real life and is a serious threat for 
competition. This assumption is in accordance with modern economic theory, which is 
followed in decisions of European Authority. Besides of these statements, it can be concluded 
that European authority integrates implicitly recoupment in decisions under abuse of 
dominant position argument. AKZO case can be shown as an example for this claim, too. In 
the decision it is claimed that the predator aimed to expel its competitors from the market and 
increase prices afterwards to gain monopolistic profit, which can be thought as a different 
definition of recoupment. (AKZO case, para 71) 
Turkish competition law is inspired by European Treaty, but by the analysis of intent 
and recoupment arguments, it can be said that examples lie in between classical and modern 
economic theory. Turkish authority takes both intent and recoupment into consideration and 
analyses cases according to these different indicators. Both arguments are taken as necessary 
preconditions for predation, thus in order to prove predation the existence of intent and 
recoupment probability will be questioned at the same time. 
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6.2 Concept of dominance 
 
Often it is believed that predatory pricing strategy can be exercised by dominant firms, 
because theoretically dominant firms can more likely recoup their losses afterwards with an 
increase in their sales. But in real life there can be cases, in which prices below cost level 
were charged not by dominant firms, but by firms with smaller market share in that specific 
market. Although that does not seem as a reasonable strategy in the first place, it can be a 
reasonable one when analyzed more deeply.  
This can happen because of two motives. In the first one, the firm may want to increase 
its market share in that specific market and become dominant. In order to get the dominant 
position, it can abuse its dominance in another market and charge predatory pricing in that 
specific one. As the firm has enough financial capabilities, it can exercise such a strategy 
financially and bear losses in that specific period. In other words, the firm can see this as an 
investment for the long run and exercise predatory pricing strategy. In the second motive, the 
firm can use its dominance in a closely related market and charge predatory prices, in order to 
strengthen its dominance in the related “main” market. Although the firm does not aim to 
become dominant in the market, in which it charges predatory prices, it will gain enough extra 
profits to recoup its losses, which can be as a matter of fact a reasonable strategy.   
As explained above, predatory pricing must not necessarily be related with dominance 
in the specific market. To analyze financial strength of the firm instead of dominance can be 
seen as a more realistic approach for predatory pricing cases. Even for firms, which are not 
dominant in their markets, predatory pricing strategy can be seen as rational, if the firm can 
not act independently from its other competitors. With this pricing strategy the firm can be 
freed of its rivals and after being dominant it can gain extra profits in that market to recoup its 
losses. 
Some differences can be seen if the cases in United States, European Union and Turkey 
are analyzed in the light of this information. United States competition authority’s approach is 
emphasizing concept of dominance more than European Commission. In United States, in 
predatory pricing cases firms were questioned at first about the dominance, which is parallel 
to the classical theory arguments. Brooke case can be shown as an example for this approach. 
As Brooke was not in dominant position in the tobacco market in US, it has been assumed 
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that Brooke can not recoup its losses and charges against it were rejected. In Matsushita case, 
objections were rejected again because of non existence of dominant position. Thus, it can be 
said that abuse of dominant position was the main argument in analyzing in suits in US.  
In European Union, cases were investigated more detailed in terms of concept of 
dominant position. Three main arguments, which are dominant position, abuse of the financial 
strength and effect of predatory pricing strategy, were questioned in interpretation of 
predatory pricing suits. At least one of the arguments -abuse of financial strength and effect of 
predatory pricing strategy-  have to be exist in the market, in which the firm operates in 
dominant position, in order a pricing strategy to be defined as predatory. For example, in 
AKZO case the market definition has been enlarged, such that both abuse and dominance has 
been exercised in the same market.  
It can be said, that predatory pricing analysis in Turkey is more close to the United 
States experience in that aspect. In charges about predatory pricing, dominant position of the 
predator is one of the necessary conditions. Generally, it is assumed that firm has to be in 
dominant position in the specified market, in order to be accused with predatory pricing 
charges. But as well as the dominance in specified market, the dominance in related markets 
has also been questioned against cross subsidy arguments. If there exists a link between the 
predatory pricing and cross subsidy arguments, then there will be a chance to blame firms for 
involving in anti competitive actions. In Turk Telekom and Aycell case (2003), which has 
been explained earlier, the market share of Aycell in the related market has been analyzed and 
it came out that Aycell was not dominant. As Aycell was not dominant, prices it charged have 
not been considered as predatory. It has been added that Turk Telekom can not be accused 
with cross subsidy, as Aycell has not been involved in predatory pricing. As the result, both 
firms have been proven innocent because of the charges against them.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
Basically, predatory pricing can be described as price reduction done by a firm for a 
short time because of factors other than efficiency. The firm mostly aims to gain or protect its 
market power with this strategy. After the predation period with higher market share, the firm 
will increase prices over the competitive level and gain extra profits to offset its losses. Thus, 
although lower prices are generally seen as in favor of competition, in predation cases they 
will hurt competition and consumer welfare in the long run.  
In order to prevent predation to happen, competition authorities try to set some criteria 
or tests as control mechanisms. As an example, in US, where predation has been an issue for 
competition authorities since the beginning of 1900s, there has been some changes in the 
approach for analyzing predatory pricing cases. At the beginning, concept of dominance has 
been investigated more likely as a precondition for predation. But as time passed, new factors 
have been added to the “check” list. Among them Areeda and Turner’s price - cost analysis 
may be shown as a milestone in predatory pricing analysis. According to their proposal, low 
prices could be a sign of healthy competition as long as they are over average variable costs. 
Prices under average variable costs can be used as proof of predation, whereas prices above 
average total costs did not have to be questioned for predation. For prices between average 
variable and total costs, the plaintiff has to bear the burden of proof of predation, which 
means that until reversely is proven, the firm charging prices between average variable and 
total cost levels could not be accused with predation. This test has introduced a more 
systematical way into the analysis of cases.  
After the Areeda and Turner cost test, there has been several different tests emerged. 
They mostly tried to incorporate predatory pricing analysis with quantative analysis methods 
for other indicators, like intent and recoupment. Greer’s Two-Tier test can be shown as 
another example. He emphasized the importance of the conditions in the relevant market and 
proposed analyze the market, if it is appropriate for predation, before other indicators have 
been questioned. He stated that when the market was not suitable for predation, the 
probability of a firm to involve in such exercises would be lower than it has been otherwise. 
Thus, he added a new type of analysis into the picture, and several new tests for predation 
analysis came out.  
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Competition authorities benefited from these several tests and analyzed suits against 
predation in their countries. Although laws for competition were alike in most countries, the 
interpretation of these laws could differ from one case to another. It can be said that United 
States competition authority followed classical economic theory more close, whereas 
European competition authority pursued an approach, which is more similar to modern 
economic theory. Thus, their analyses of predation cases differ from each other. US 
competition authority depends more on quantitative proof (like cost, dominance – market 
share analysis, etc...) whereas European Commission tries incorporating other arguments as 
well. It can be said that Turkish experience lies in between these approaches. Turkish 
authority emphasizes the importance of cost and economic dominance analysis as well as 
intent and recoupment arguments. It also investigates the real aim of the firm charging 
predatory prices besides the factors affecting the situation.  
In order to sum up, it has to be stated that predatory pricing is an important issue in 
competition, as the effect of lower prices on economy can be very significant. Since the proof 
of predation necessitates incorporating several factors affecting the market and firms, the 
analysis has to be done in detail. If possible, it would be better to apply the relevant tests and 
investigate the issue from different points of view.   
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